Incompatible interests in conspiracy cases (the Deniece Cornejo – Cedric Lee cases)

Incompatible interests in conspiracy cases (the Deniece Cornejo – Cedric Lee cases)

        News peg: “(Updated 1:31 p.m.) Businessman Cedric Lee and Simeon “Zimmer” Raz, suspects in the mauling of TV host-actor Vhong Navarro, on Tuesday arrived at the Taguig City Regional Trial Court for the hearing of their petition for bail and motion for continuance of detention at the NBI compound.” (GMA7 News). “ (Updated 11:38am) A day after surrendering to the Philippine National Police, model-stylist Deniece Cornejo was brought to the Taguig City regional trial court early Tuesday.” (GMA7 News). “

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        When Deniece Cornejo surrendered, she was surrounded, this time, by people who truly cared about her personal welfare: Her grandma, her grandfather, her immediate family members. (in the early stages of the investigation of this case, she kept them away). The family brought with them a lawyer. Deniece Cornejo also has another legal team, the same legal team retained from the beginning, handling all of the accused.

       Let’s look at what the Court has said about that. This is a hypothetical discussion, I haven’t seen all of the evidence here.

     In a conspiracy, is it wise to have one lawyer or one law office or one legal team, representing all of the accused? For some of the principals, yes, but for some of the accused, maybe not. And the court has agreed in certain decided cases: That is: it may be not in the interest of justice to have just one lawyer (or one law office or legal team) representing all of the accused. That lawyer (or law office or legal team), the court has said in certain cases, may have a conflict of interest because the accused in a criminal conspiracy have incompatible interests, or what some criminal trial lawyers call “mutually incompatible interests” (I put that in quotes because in very complicated organized crimes, the conspiracy is so intricate that the interests are multidirectional, but multi-directionally incompatible interests seem wordy).

(Image rightclicked from philnews.ph, “Before” photo, screen-grab from a 2009 Wowowee episode; used here non-commercially for academic purposes)

      To put it in simple terms: Some of the accused may be “less guilty” …. and might get a better deal… The lawyer on the other hand wants to save all – — may even be duty-bound to save all. Walang laglagan.

      Here’s what the Court has had to say in some decided cases: “(The Bill of Rights of) the Constitution guarantees that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to have the effective assistance of counsel.” U.S. CONST.AM. VI. … (This) bestows two corollary rights: the right to choose and be represented by one’s preferred counsel; see Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988); United States v. Lowry, 971 F.2d 55, 59 (7th Cir.1992); and the right to be represented by an attorney “with unwavering, undivided loyalty to the defendant.” United States v. Messino, 852 F.Supp. 652, 654 (N.D.Ill.1994) (citing Lowry, 971 F.2d at 59 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980))).(Underscoring supplied).

      “However, when codefendants want to be represented by the same attorney, these two rights can clash, and the court must step in. See Lowry, 971 F.2d at 59. “While `permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants … is not per se violative of constitutional [914 F.Supp. 277] guarantees of effective assistance of counsel,’ … a court confronted with and alerted to possible conflicts of interests must take adequate steps to ascertain whether the conflicts warrant separate counsel.” Wheat, 486 U.S. 153, 159-60, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1178, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)). (Underscoring supplied).

(photo rightclicked from interaksyon.com, used here non-commercially for academic purposes)

       “Furthermore, although a defendant may waive his or her right to conflict-free counsel, the trial court still remains obligated to address the situation. The court has a duty “to ensure that criminal defendants receive a trial that is fair and does not contravene the Sixth Amendment.” Messino, 852 F.Supp. at 655 (citing Wheat, 486 U.S. at 161, 108 S.Ct. at 1698). The court also has an “institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases,” because criminal proceedings must “appear fair to all who observe them.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 160, 108 S.Ct. at 1698.

      “Therefore, a trial court faced with a conflict can require separate counsel to represent codefendants in spite of defendants’ waivers. This is so even where the conflict has not materialized, but is merely a possibility. As the Supreme Court stated in Wheat, “the district court must be allowed substantial latitude in refusing waivers of conflicts of interest not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but in the more common cases where a potential conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses.” Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163, 108 S.Ct. at 1699. (Underscoring supplied).

      “In deciding whether to disqualify a defendant’s chosen counsel, the court must evaluate and balance the interests of the defendant, the other client represented by the defendant’s counsel, the government, and the court and public based on the circumstances of each particular case. See United States v. O’Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 790 (7th Cir.1986).” (U.S. v. Harmon, OS. 92 CR 166, 95 CV 5560.)