“Lawyers, Jails, & the Law’s Fake Bargains” by Michael Tigar, excerpts, part2

 

Aachen, Hans von. Allegory. 1598. Oil on copper, 56 x 47 cm. Alte Pinakothek, Munich. Downloaded with express permission from the Web Gallery of Art at http://www.wga.hu from site admin Emil Kren, Ph.D.. Many thanks.

“Lawyers, Jails, and the Law’s Fake Bargains” by Michael  Tigar,  published by the Monthly Review at www.monthlyreview.org/lawrise

            (excerpts from the 15-page article, second instalment, apologies from the blog admin for the excerpted version, blog viewers have a short attention span. )        

        (Michael Tigar is an American University Washington College of  Law Professor  (Constitutional Law; Supreme Court; French legal system; criminal law and procedure; human rights); ; one of the most renowned lawyers in the United States. He has argued seven cases before the U.S. Supreme Court and more than 100 appellate cases; written extensively about litigation, aspects of trial practice, criminal law, the death penalty, and the role of the criminal defense lawyer. His books include Fighting Injustice (ABA, 2002); Federal Appeals: Jurisdiction and Practice; and Examining Witnesses.  Throughout his career, Tigar has been active in pro bono cases, the American Bar Association, continuing legal education programs, and international human rights. During the apartheid period, he went to South Africa to train black lawyers. Prior to joining AU, Tigar served as a professor at the University of Texas Law School)

        Quote “In addition, there are dozens of communities where defendants may be held without bail for weeks at a time, due to crowded court dockets. Because a poor person cannot post cash bond, he or she stays in jail. The racial disparity in arrest patterns is then compounded by the disparity between rich and poor. In these communities, it is often the practice not to appoint counsel until the defendant appears in court after the long delay. By this device, the accused is kept in jail for want of a lawyer to move for low bail or release on personal recognizance. The social consequences of this system are that the jailed accused, though presumed innocent, loses whatever employment he or she may have had, and risks a breakdown in family and community ties.

          Quote “True, the constitution formally guarantees effective assistance of counsel. This ought to be, and could be if properly interpreted, a mechanism for ensuring that the contract between counsel and accused reflects the client’s desires and interests. Not so.

              Quote “In the world of commerce, when a wealthy person hires a lawyer, the lawyer is required to communicate with the client and to provide zealous and diligent representation. If the legal issues involved are complex or specialized, the lawyer must warn the client if he or she lacks the training and experience that may be required. The contract in this setting is dictated by the client’s expressed goals, and the rules of legal ethics operate predominantly to require that the lawyer diligently and skilfully  fulfill the bargain. The legal ethics do, however, require that the lawyer not assist the client in wrongdoing. In the main, however, the state through its courts and agencies supports the fulfillment of the wealthy client’s desires and goals.

           Quote “In sharp contrast, the relationship between the indigent accused and appointed counsel is governed by loose and discretionary standards. In reviewing a case to determine whether counsel was ineffective, the courts give wide latitude to so-called tactical decisions, including decisions not to investigate possible defenses, to refrain from cross-examining witnesses, and to make only token arguments to the jury. As the Supreme Court has said, “judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” “Deferential” to what? To the lawyer’s decision to do less than might be done or than the client would wish.

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        Quote “This brings us to the contract that is related to that between the appointed lawyer and the client, and that is the plea bargain. A defendant is charged. The appointed lawyer points out that he could remain in jail and wait for trial, probably be convicted, and then spend significant jail time. On the other hand, a guilty plea would probably result in a lesser sentence, and for minor crimes release for “time already served.” The lawyer, because of the nature of his “contract” with the client, is of course in a position to make the dark side of this dream come true, for his indifference and inattention would make conviction quite likely if the case were to be tried.

               Quote “Thus begins a typical scenario in the 90 percent of all criminal cases that end in a plea bargain. The “contract” between the accused and the state follows a ritual form. The accused is asked if he understands the charges. At the lawyer’s prodding he says yes. He is asked if he wishes to waive a trial, and all the rights to summon and cross-examine witnesses that would be involved in a trial. The accused, often sensing that he has no realistic choice, says yes. The judge then seals the bargain and imposes sentence.

          Quote “What’s wrong with this picture? Two main things: the purported consent is unreal, and the accused is not truly informed of the rights he is forfeiting. Recently, prosecutors have added a third dimension to the unfairness by seeking waivers of the right to appeal.

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      Quote “The newer wrinkle in all of this is the by-now routine  prosecution insistence that the defendant, as part of the bargain, affirmatively promise never to challenge the plea bargain as unfair. In ordinary commerce, this would be like buying a car after a strong sales pitch, and under pressure to purchase, and being forced to agree that you could not bring the car back to the dealer even if it was lethally unsafe. Some appellate courts are questioning the validity of such agreements, but they often, and perhaps mostly, are upheld.

        Quote “So we are shovelling people into the prisons at this enormous rate. The root causes are no doubt overcriminalization and racially-biased police and prosecution decisions. But the twin and phony contracts between lawyer and client and between client and the state gravely weaken the ostensible constitutional provisions that are designed to provide review and remedy for those sorts of abuses. XXXXX

      XXXXXX” closed-quote.

(second of three excerpted instalments)

on today’s breaking news, Oakwood promulgation, plea of guilt, some provisions

ON TODAY’S BREAKING NEWS, PROMULGATION OF DECISION,  NINE ACCUSED, PLEA OF GUILT, OAKWOOD ASSEMBLY; SOME PROVISIONS ON: COUP, ILLEGAL ASSEMBLY, MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE, PARDON, BAIL.

(Natoire, Charles-Joseph. Venus Demanding Arms from Vulcan for Aeneas. After 1732. Oil on canvas, 194 x 140 cm. Musée Fabre, Montpellier. Downloaded with express permission from the Web Gallery of Art at http://www.wga.hu from site admin Emil Kren, Ph.D.. Many thanks.)

  

 

 

REVISED PENAL CODE:

          “Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d’ tat. – Any person who promotes, maintains or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

          “Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal.

        “Any  person who leads or in any manner directs or commands others to undertake a coup d’ tat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

        “Any  person in the government service who participates, or executes directions or commands of others in undertaking a coup d’ tat shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period.

       “Any person not in the government service who participates, or in any manner supports, finances, abets or aids in undertaking a coup d’ tat shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period.

          “When the rebellion, insurrection, or coup d’ tat shall be under the command of unknown leaders, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, as performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels shall be deemed a leader of such rebellion, insurrection, or coup d’ tat. (As amended by Republic Act No. 6968, approved on October 24, 1990) (underscoring supplied)

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          “Article 146. Illegal assemblies. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period shall be imposed upon the organizers or leaders of any meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of committing any of the crimes punishable under this Code, or of any meeting in which the audience is incited to the commission of the crime of treason, rebellion or insurrection, sedition or assault upon a person in authority or his agents.  Persons merely present at such meeting shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor, unless they are armed, in which case the penalty shall be prision correccional.  (underscoring supplied)

 

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          “Article 27. Reclusion perpetua. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty years and one day to forty years.

         “Reclusion temporal. – The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years.

        “Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. – The duration of the penalties of prision correccional, suspension and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when suspension is imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

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          “Article 13. Mitigating circumstances. – The following are mitigating circumstances:

 

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       “7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution.

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        “10. And, finally, any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned.

 

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          “Article 36. Pardon; its effect. – A pardon shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.

          “A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

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RULES OF COURT:

 

           “Rule 114. Section 5. Bail, when discretionary.  Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.”