When life hangs on the balance and the reporter is the first to arrive (Covering earthquakes and other tragedies)
(continued from yesterday’s post on covering earthquakes and other tragedies. This section explores ethical issues arising when a journalist is confronted with a situation where life hangs on the balance, and the reporter is the first to arrive at the scene even before the police and paramedics could respond)
From: “Tragedies & Journalists” published by the Dart Center, a project of the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, written by Joe Hight and Frank Smyth (Joe Hight is the president of the Dart Center for Journalism & Trauma’s Executive Committee; led a team of The Oklahoman reporters that covered the 1995 Oklahoma bombing; the coverage won several national awards; Frank Smyth is a free-lance journalist , contributor to “Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know”, edited by Roy Gutman & David Rieff; Washington representative of the New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists.)
“VII. Journalist as First Responder
“ XXX XXX
“Ethical issues include the question of whether to provide aid to injured victims or help in the evacuation before emergency responders arrive. Simply doing your job and ignoring the victims’ plight might be considered morally wrong by the public.
“Besides the ethical issue of helping victims, reporters or photographers must consider the dangers of covering violent attacks. First responders should be aware of their safety and surroundings when they first arrive at a scene.
“These risks include whether:
• The perpetrator is still in the area.
• A threat of violence continues or anything dangerous is near.
• An area is still contaminated in the event of a biological accident.
• Terrorists plan for a secondary bomb or attack.
“During an address to UNESCO in Jamaica , Rodney Pinder, director of the International News Safety Institute, said journalists must be more willing to accept training to protect themselves from both physical and psychological harm.
“ “Many still behave like cowboys, putting themselves and their associates at risk,” he said.
“Supervisors also must face the responsibility of sending reporters and photographers, especially younger and inexperienced ones, into potentially dangerous situations. They should seek ways to protect their journalists and advise them of appropriate precautions.
“Newsday and the Washington Post have bought safety equipment to help safeguard their reporters and photographers who cover dangerous situations, according to a March 2003 story by Newsday’s James T. Madore. Also, several journalists at the “Homeland Terrorism” conference said that they had received special safety training.
“Howard A. Tyner, editorial vice president of Tribune Co. publishing division, told Madore that its newspapers wouldn’t force journalists to cover dangerous events and would advise them of safety precautions. Those newspapers include the Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune and Newsday.
“ “Remember, not only is no story worth a reporter’s life, but a dead reporter isn’t going to report anything,” Tyner said. Finally, and maybe most importantly, journalists and their supervisors must be aware of the psychological effects. Debriefing and even counseling may be necessary to offset the possible emotional damage caused by being a first responder.
“As officer Hagen noted (Los Angeles police officer, participant at the June 2003 conference, “Homeland Terrorism: A Primer for First-responder Journalists”) today’s journalists must realize that being first to a violent or terrorist attack carries significant risk – both physically and psychologically.” (Hight and Smyth, 2003)
Newspeg: “Two TV crew members who disappeared along with a Jordanian journalist last June were “recovered” in Sulu Saturday night, but police could not immediately say if ransom was paid for their release.” (gmanetwork.com/news)
Last year, in the aftermath of the kidnapping of three members of the Red Cross by the Abu Sayyaf, the Sulu governor organized private armies, issued a proclamation declaring a state of emergency, imposed curfew, and called out the police and the armed forces to conduct warrantless searches, seizures, and arrests. Several residents were warrantlessly arrested and detained on no probable cause except the mere affidavit of a policeman that they were Abu Sayyaf members.
The Supreme Court in a case promulgated seven months ago unanimously held: 1.The commander-in-chief powers (“calling out” powers) are vested by the Constitution only on the President; 2. the governor has no such commander-in-chief powers, and cannot on his own organize private armies. Here’s the case (excerpted):
Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hji. Moh. Yusop Ismi, Julhajan Awadi, SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, Petitioners, (as taxpayers and residents of Sulu) vs. Gov. Abdusakur M. Tan in his capacity as governor of Sulu, Gen. Juancho Saban, Col. Eugenio Clemen PN, P/ Supt. Julasurim Kasim, and P/Supt. Bienvenido G. Latag, in their capacity as officers of the Phil. Marines and PNP, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 187298 July 3, 2012. en banc.
Sereno, J.
“On 15 January 2009, three members of the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped … in Patikul, Sulu. xxx
xxx
“The leader of the alleged kidnappers was identified as Raden Abu, a former guard at the Sulu Provincial Jail. News reports linked Abu to Albader Parad, one of the known leaders of the Abu Sayyaf. xxx
xxx
“Governor Tan organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities, who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul.
xxx
“The organization of the CEF was embodied in a “Memorandum of Understanding” entered into between three parties: the provincial government of Sulu, represented by Governor Tan; the Armed Forces of the Philippines, represented by Gen. Saban; and the Philippine National Police, represented by P/SUPT. Latag.
xxx
“The Whereas clauses of the Memorandum alluded to the extraordinary
situation in Sulu, and the willingness of civilian supporters of the municipal
mayors to offer their services in order that “the early and safe rescue of the
hostages may be achieved.” xxx
“On 31 March 2009, Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009 (Proclamation 1-09), declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. It cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, xxx
xxx
“In the same Proclamation, respondent Tan called upon the PNP and the CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety. The pertinent portion of the proclamation states:
“Now, therefore, by virtue of the powers vested in my by law, I, Abdusakur Mahail Tan, Governor of the Province of Sulu, do hereby declare a state of emergency in the province of Sulu, and call on the Philippine National Police with the assistance of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Civilian Emergency Force to implement the following:
“1. The setting-up of checkpoints and chokepoints in the province;
“2. The imposition of curfew for the entire province subject to such Guidelines as may be issued by proper authorities;
“3. The conduct of General Search and Seizure including arrests in the pursuit of the kidnappers and their supporters; and
“4. To conduct such other actions or police operations as may be necessary to ensure public safety. xxx”
xxx
“On 1 April 2009, SPO1 Sattal Jadjuli was instructed by his superior to report to respondent P/SUPT. Julasirim Kasim. Upon arriving at the police station, he was booked, and interviewed about his relationship to Musin, Jaiton, and Julamin, who were all his deceased relatives. Upon admitting that he was indeed related to the three, he was detained. After a few hours, former Punong Barangay Juljahan Awadi, Hadji Hadjirul Bambra, Abdugajir Hadjirul, as well as PO2 Marcial Hajan, SPO3 Muhilmi Ismula, Punong Barangay Alano Mohammad and jeepney driver Abduhadi Sabdani, were also arrested. The affidavit of the apprehending officer alleged that they were suspected ASG supporters and were being arrested under Proclamation 1-09. The following day, 2 April 2009, the hostage Mary Jane Lacaba was released by the ASG. xxx
xxx
“On 16 April 2009, Jamar M. Kulayan, Temogen S. Tulawie, Hadji Mohammad Yusop Ismi, Ahajan Awadi, and SPO1 Sattal H. Jadjuli, residents of Patikul, Sulu, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, claiming that roclamation 1-09 was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as it threatened fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article III of the 1987 Constitution. xxx
xxx
(The Supreme Court unanimously struck down the governor’s Proclamation 1-09 as unconstitutional on the following grounds: )
“II. Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the commander-in-chief of the Republic . The exceptional character of Commander-in-Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one president.
xxx
“(I)t is clear that the framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise unbridled control over the police in emergency situations. This is without prejudice to their authority over police units in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and their prerogative to seek assistance from the police in day to day situations, as contemplated by the Constitutional Commission. But as a civilian agency of the government, the police, through the NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and is subject to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.
xxx
“The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President. Given the foregoing, respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
xxx
“Taken in conjunction with each other, it becomes clear that the Constitution does not authorize the organization of private armed groups similar to the CEF convened by the respondent Governor.
